The study of the relationships between change of ruling party and constitutional functioning in Taiwan(1997－2011)

• Main Authors: Chou Paihsin, 周百信
• Other Authors: Lu Bingkuan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95068161962850803510

碩士 === 國立臺中教育大學 === 社會科教育學系碩士班 === 99 === In 1997 constitutional amendments significantly adjusted the central government system to a system similar to the French dual executive system or semi-presidential system in Taiwan. The president shall be elected by direct popular vote and he possesses quite considerable powers, for example, the president may to determine major policies for national security；the president of the Executive Yuan be appointed by the president, requiring no consent of the Legislative Yuan. But the Executive Yuan shall be the highest administrative organ of the State. Therefore, the constitutional system causing ambiguity concerning the distribution of administrative power. Furthermore, the Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan.The Legis-lative Yuan may propose a no-confidence vote against the president of the Executive Yuan , and at the same time, the president of the Executive Yuan may request that the president dissolve the Legislative Yuan. In other words, current constitutional laws stipulate that only when the legislature overthrows the cabinet can the president exercise passively the power to dissolve the legislature. This differentiates Taiwan's constitutional system with that of the dual executive system. In addition, when the Executive Yuan request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider a statutory or budgetary bill. Should more than one-half of the total number of Legislative Yuan members uphold the original bill, the president of the Executive Yuan shall immediately accept the said bill.Therefore, not only the design of the current constitution is laden with contradictions and incompatibilities, its actual implementation is also morbidly inefficient, especially in 2000-2008 years, the first change of ruling party also appeared minority regime, the government faces immediate risk of a total shutdown, the constitutional mechanism provided was unable to resolve the friction between administrative and legislative power. In general, Taiwan's current constitution, it can create potentially destabilizing competition between the President and the Legislative Yuan. Any time we have a president and the legis-lative majority belonging to different political parties hostile to each other. Obviously the fourth constitutional amendment set the stage for a constitutional deadlock, and due to immature democratic culture and lack of constitutional convention. In light of this, this case study adopted systems approach, new institutionalism and jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation to survey what are the differentiates constitutional functioning among the Lee Teng-hui(majority regime), Chen Shui-bian(minority regime) and current president Ma Ying-jeou(majority regime). This article intends to explore the current constitution of relationships among President, Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.The major issue today is how to build upon constitutionalism already in place and establish stronger democratic constitutional governance.