Compensation and Firm Performance ─ A Study of the Banking Industry in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Yu-Hsien Chen, 陳昱憲
• Other Authors: Ying-Fen Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/75qbg4

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 會計與財務碩士學位學程 === 99 === This study examine whether there is a positive relationship between director compensation and CEO compensation, in banking firms of Taiwan or not. This relationship could be due to firm complexity which requires higher levels of skill or effort by the CEO and directors to improve future performance. Alternatively, the positive relationship between CEO and director could be due to cronyism which is useless to improve future performance. Using data is form publicly trades in banking industry of Taiwan during 2005 to 2007. In this study, I also compare two bank groups, including financial holding subsidiary banks and non-financial holding banks. The conclusion of this study is that the higher director compensation is, the higher CEO compensation would be in non-financial holding banks. It also mention that future performance and the compensation between direct and CEO, we find positive relationship between direct compensation and future security performance in financial holding subsidiary banks. In the other hand, we also find negtive relationship between direct compensation and future profitability performance in non-financail holding banks.