The Effect of Board Characteristics on Compensation Structure

碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 99 === In 2005, Securities and Futures Bureau in Taiwan announced the amendments about the disclosure guidelines of public companies. The original regulation is that companies should disclose the compensation information of top managers and board directors in detail. In...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: YIN-JI CHIOU, 邱瀅之
Other Authors: Shou-Min Tsao
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30568545760184086758
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 99 === In 2005, Securities and Futures Bureau in Taiwan announced the amendments about the disclosure guidelines of public companies. The original regulation is that companies should disclose the compensation information of top managers and board directors in detail. In the revision, companies just have to divide the compensation to several levels and disclose the number of executives in each level.   In this study, we want to investigate the effect of these amendments on the executives’ compensation level and the sensitivity between compensation and performance.   This study chooses the companies in Taiwan electronic industry from 2002 to 2008 as the sample data. The empirical analysis result shows that, after the guidelines have been changed, the compensation level of executives is significantly higher, and the sensitivity between compensation and performance is dropped significantly. Furthermore, we analyze this relationship from the view of board characteristics. The result shows that the stronger the board’s monitoring abilities, the less increase of the executive compensation and the less the reduction of sensitivity between compensation and performance.