| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 金融研究所 === 99 === In this study, we conducted a rough assessment of the impact of new Basel capital adequacy ratio on Taiwanese banking system as a consultation of regulatory amendment. The empirical results show: when the capital ratio is low, the bank will raise lending rates, reduce lending volume and other risk assets, at the same time raise capital by retaining earnings and issuing qualified bonds. Taiwan's banks in general increased capital greater than reducing risk weighted assets, suggesting that although the banks would follow the pecking order theory of the cost of capital when capitalization, but may pay more attention to asset size and market share. Reflects the phenomenon of excessive competition over the banking system in Taiwan‐banks would rather use more expensive capital than cutting loans to achieve target capital ratio. We also found that, the effectiveness of regulatory interventions intended to raise banks’ ability to absorb losses may be somewhat muted unless such capital requirements mandate the type of capital that must be raised, the banks had the incentives to favor adjustments to tiers 2 and 3 capital (or to the deductions that they make from total capital) over adjustments to tier 1 capital in order to achieve the target capital ratio. As the result, to effectively improve the banks’ ability to absorb losses, the supervisory units should add the requirements of core capital adequacy ratio and take prompt corrective actions when banks exhibit progressively deteriorating capital ratios.
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