| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 財稅所 === 99 === This paper extends the framework of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to study how the government to formulate optimal insurance taxation. It is shown that: (1) If the insurance market exist complete information, optimal insurance tax rates depend on the tax effect, and the expected utility effect. When the relative risk aversion index of high-risk and low-risk insurees is lower, the optimal premium tax rate should be greater than the optimal benefit tax rate; on the contrary, when the relative risk aversion index of high-risk and low-risk insurees is higher, the optimal premium tax rate should be less than the optimal benefit tax rate. (2) If the Adverse selection is present, optimal insurance tax rates depend on the tax effect, the expected utility effect, and the self-selection constraint effect. The formulation of the insurance taxation is similar to complete information, but the gap between the premium tax rate and the benefit tax rate will narrow. In addition, the result also show that: if the relative risk aversion index of high-risk and low-risk insurees is higher, the optimal insurance taxation argument is the same with Boyer (2000); on the contrary, if the relative risk aversion index of high-risk and low-risk insurees is lower, the optimal insurance taxation argument is different from Boyer (2000). Therefore, Boyer (2000) argument is not entirely robust.
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