| Summary: | 碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 會計所 === 99 === This research is conducted under the premise that it is quite common the ownership of the contemporary enterprise is separated from the right to operate; therefore under the circumstances that the owner and the operator are not the same person, i.e. the agent problem derived from both the principal and the agent who are all in the multiple status will be researched as result.
This thesis intends to complement multiple vs. multiple agent models which have not been delved into within traditional literatures and proceed to in-depth findings, and explores the interactions between two principals and two agents respectively. Major conclusions of this research are: 1. When all productions are independent, when the profit for the principal is the distribution between share possessed between principals and agent output, the optimal incentive plan would be “individual compensation contracts”. 2. When both principals decide to jointly cooperate with each other, the marginal reward offered to the agent by principal should be equivalent to the marginal income for the principal; then, both principals can reach the goal of maximizing their joint profits. 3. Elasticity of demand in the market situation is big, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a positive correlation. Elasticities of demand in the market situation is small, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a negative correlation. When Elasticity of demand in the market situation is equal to 1, the principals give the agent reward, but the principals will lead to loss of profits. 4. When the principals hold shares will be taken into account when the cost of capital: (1) when profit is greater than the cost of Capital, following two results: (i) assume that the principals make decisions with the same time, the two principals hold of the shares will form two half principals hold shares in each situation. (ii) assuming two principals are not at the same time to make decisions, the principals will form a single case with a number of agents. (2) Conversely, when profit is less than the cost of Capital, the two principals do not hold shares. Finally, if the interest rate is set to share a function: (1)If Interest rate function first-order differential is greater than 0, profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution (2) If Interest rate function first-order differential is less than 0 , profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution. (3) If Interest rate function first-order differential is equal 0, this result is the same with the four propositions.
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