Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective

碩士 === 長榮大學 === 職業安全與衛生學系碩士班 === 99 === Near miss management has the advantage of control risk in advance. However there exists the nature of the moral hazard debate in the work to disclose the failure information of "unsafe acts" and "unsafe condition" to themselves or others. T...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Huang,Shoushan, 黃壽山
Other Authors: 謝賢書
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29861167681156013741
id ndltd-TW-099CJU00590022
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-TW-099CJU005900222015-10-13T20:04:04Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29861167681156013741 Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective 從代理觀點初探虛驚事件提報機制 Huang,Shoushan 黃壽山 碩士 長榮大學 職業安全與衛生學系碩士班 99 Near miss management has the advantage of control risk in advance. However there exists the nature of the moral hazard debate in the work to disclose the failure information of "unsafe acts" and "unsafe condition" to themselves or others. This study aims to explore the reporting of near miss by employees and design approach of incentive system by the corporate while in the agent perspective. The research method uses in the analysis of agency theory as a basis for the establishment of a "Principal - Agent" model. Appling mathematics of the derivation, so that enterprises in the case of expected utility maximization, how to submit with the number and decided to incentive compensation payment . Inference model and the results showed that: (1) under symmetric information, incentive compensation payment is a fixed value; (2) under asymmetric information, the principle of optimal incentive compensation payment could be depended on the number of submitting ; (3) the larger of the gap the submitting cost to the staff, the greater of the gap of incentive compensation payment should be; (4) When the company can not distinguish the recognition level of the staff to near miss, the cost of incentive compensation payment will increase; (5) If there exists a lure of cheating to the employee, the enterprise should submit the number of low, even zero. The findings and management recommendations are: (1) companies can organize on job training regularly to maintain the submitting quality of near miss reporting; (2) ) for the payment of incentive compensation with incentives, companies should comprehensively evaluate the cost of the reporting by its staff; (3) companies should establish an independent investigation and evaluation department of near miss to avoid the loss of critical information; (4) regularly follow the trend of submitting to ensure reasonable operation of the incentive compensation system. 謝賢書 2011 學位論文 ; thesis 52 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 長榮大學 === 職業安全與衛生學系碩士班 === 99 === Near miss management has the advantage of control risk in advance. However there exists the nature of the moral hazard debate in the work to disclose the failure information of "unsafe acts" and "unsafe condition" to themselves or others. This study aims to explore the reporting of near miss by employees and design approach of incentive system by the corporate while in the agent perspective. The research method uses in the analysis of agency theory as a basis for the establishment of a "Principal - Agent" model. Appling mathematics of the derivation, so that enterprises in the case of expected utility maximization, how to submit with the number and decided to incentive compensation payment . Inference model and the results showed that: (1) under symmetric information, incentive compensation payment is a fixed value; (2) under asymmetric information, the principle of optimal incentive compensation payment could be depended on the number of submitting ; (3) the larger of the gap the submitting cost to the staff, the greater of the gap of incentive compensation payment should be; (4) When the company can not distinguish the recognition level of the staff to near miss, the cost of incentive compensation payment will increase; (5) If there exists a lure of cheating to the employee, the enterprise should submit the number of low, even zero. The findings and management recommendations are: (1) companies can organize on job training regularly to maintain the submitting quality of near miss reporting; (2) ) for the payment of incentive compensation with incentives, companies should comprehensively evaluate the cost of the reporting by its staff; (3) companies should establish an independent investigation and evaluation department of near miss to avoid the loss of critical information; (4) regularly follow the trend of submitting to ensure reasonable operation of the incentive compensation system.
author2 謝賢書
author_facet 謝賢書
Huang,Shoushan
黃壽山
author Huang,Shoushan
黃壽山
spellingShingle Huang,Shoushan
黃壽山
Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
author_sort Huang,Shoushan
title Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
title_short Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
title_full Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
title_fullStr Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
title_full_unstemmed Near Miss Reporting Mechanism from The Agent Perspective
title_sort near miss reporting mechanism from the agent perspective
publishDate 2011
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29861167681156013741
work_keys_str_mv AT huangshoushan nearmissreportingmechanismfromtheagentperspective
AT huángshòushān nearmissreportingmechanismfromtheagentperspective
AT huangshoushan cóngdàilǐguāndiǎnchūtànxūjīngshìjiàntíbàojīzhì
AT huángshòushān cóngdàilǐguāndiǎnchūtànxūjīngshìjiàntíbàojīzhì
_version_ 1718042973687513088