| Summary: | 碩士 === 長榮大學 === 職業安全與衛生學系碩士班 === 99 === Near miss management has the advantage of control risk in advance. However there exists the nature of the moral hazard debate in the work to disclose the failure information of "unsafe acts" and "unsafe condition" to themselves or others. This study aims to explore the reporting of near miss by employees and design approach of incentive system by the corporate while in the agent perspective. The research method uses in the analysis of agency theory as a basis for the establishment of a "Principal - Agent" model. Appling mathematics of the derivation, so that enterprises in the case of expected utility maximization, how to submit with the number and decided to incentive compensation payment . Inference model and the results showed that: (1) under symmetric information, incentive compensation payment is a fixed value; (2) under asymmetric information, the principle of optimal incentive compensation payment could be depended on the number of submitting ; (3) the larger of the gap the submitting cost to the staff, the greater of the gap of incentive compensation payment should be; (4) When the company can not distinguish the recognition level of the staff to near miss, the cost of incentive compensation payment will increase; (5) If there exists a lure of cheating to the employee, the enterprise should submit the number of low, even zero. The findings and management recommendations are: (1) companies can organize on job training regularly to maintain the submitting quality of near miss reporting; (2) ) for the payment of incentive compensation with incentives, companies should comprehensively evaluate the cost of the reporting by its staff; (3) companies should establish an independent investigation and evaluation department of near miss to avoid the loss of critical information; (4) regularly follow the trend of submitting to ensure reasonable operation of the incentive compensation system.
|
|---|
