A Study of the Management Effect of the Slopeland Areas in Taiwan : Agency Theory Perspective

• Main Authors: Chien-Ping Wu, 吳建平
• Other Authors: none
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70830092238304746287

碩士 === 雲林科技大學 === 會計系研究所 === 98 === In the past few years, the disasters of Taiwan slopeland have emerged in an endless stream. In addition to the causes of greenhouse effect, global warming which led to unusual climate change, the man-made over-exploitation, overload exploitation and not doing our best to keep conservation of water and soil put a premium on the probability of the disasters of slopeland. The purpose of this research is to explore the influence of agency theory on management effect of Taiwan slopeland. The primary participants are mainly those major stakeholders in existing administrative organizations who have an influence on slopeland management policies – leading officers of organization, executive officers, and public opinion representatives. The research methods include literature review, case study, and in-depth interview, which were used to analyze the establishment and management status quo of slopland management system in a descriptive and exploratory manner. The research findings suggested that government organizations have executed slopeland management policies for a long time and that the slopeland management effect has not been satisfactory due to “asymmetric information” and such agency problems as “morality hazard” and “adverse selection” brought about by the interest collision between the consignor and agent. In order to improve this situation, the researcher offered three suggestions. First, the system of open government information should be established and put into effect so that all the people could be informed of the real management situation of the government and if the budget could reach the expected goal in order that all the people could watch over the management situation to get rid of the occurrence of “asymmetric information”. Second, accountability system should be established; the agent’s responsibility should be increased; and the “collusion” cost between agents should be added in order to lower the probability of agent problems. Third, faultless reward system should be established; amount range of reward should be increased; and granting timing of reward should be adjusted in order to raise the morale of occupational activity undertakers and against-regulation reporters so as to prevent from such agent problems as “morality hazard” and “collusion”.