The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory

碩士 === 臺北市立教育大學 === 社會學習領域教學碩士學位班 === 98 === The main purpose of this research is to explore that two sides going through several talks is how to influence the policy of transportation between Taiwan and China. The research will pinpoint the problems and look for the opportunity of development in th...

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Main Authors: Li-Ta Lan, 藍立達
Other Authors: Shu-Ming Hsu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/07139616905461598513
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spelling ndltd-TW-098TMTC52010242015-10-13T18:35:36Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/07139616905461598513 The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory 以雙層賽局理論分析兩岸通航政策 Li-Ta Lan 藍立達 碩士 臺北市立教育大學 社會學習領域教學碩士學位班 98 The main purpose of this research is to explore that two sides going through several talks is how to influence the policy of transportation between Taiwan and China. The research will pinpoint the problems and look for the opportunity of development in the future from the policy background. The analysing period is illustrated with president Chen Shui-bian on corss- strait transportation beginning to break through for the beginning. Sencond, the research is illustrated the development from the president Ma Ying-jiu putting the policy of direct transportation in pratice. All of these are in order to understand the development course of the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China in depth. The analysing range is illustrated from president Chen Shui-bian is in power , which analysing the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China with two-level game theory. Then this part is analysed the policy content when president Ma Ying-jiu in power . And then, the policy of cross-strait transportation is analysed and compared to carry on between president Chen Shui-bian and president Ma Ying-jiu in power. At last, combining the analysis result of two periods above-mentioned and two-level game theory, I make the conclusion for the development between Taiwan and China in the future. The result of the policy of cross-strait transportation is analysed in the period between president Chen Shui-bian and president Ma Ying-jiu, including two-level game theory and win-set. According to the inference with two-level gmae theory, thestudy brings up two-level game theory and win-set developing strategy, then makes a description how to adjust the the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China in the two-level game theory’s factors considered. In the future, when the revelant policy is consulted, we should first consider the will of people, the present situation of economic development, and the national security. Especially the national security topic is the most important topic of cross-strait negotiations. With two sides' three direct links and other policies are carried out, it is under prerequisites that should improve people's welfare and stand state sovereignty in our country, and then carrying on the negotiation work of every open policy with China progressively . Key words : cross-strait transportation、the analysis of policy、two-level game theory Shu-Ming Hsu 徐淑敏 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 171 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 臺北市立教育大學 === 社會學習領域教學碩士學位班 === 98 === The main purpose of this research is to explore that two sides going through several talks is how to influence the policy of transportation between Taiwan and China. The research will pinpoint the problems and look for the opportunity of development in the future from the policy background. The analysing period is illustrated with president Chen Shui-bian on corss- strait transportation beginning to break through for the beginning. Sencond, the research is illustrated the development from the president Ma Ying-jiu putting the policy of direct transportation in pratice. All of these are in order to understand the development course of the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China in depth. The analysing range is illustrated from president Chen Shui-bian is in power , which analysing the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China with two-level game theory. Then this part is analysed the policy content when president Ma Ying-jiu in power . And then, the policy of cross-strait transportation is analysed and compared to carry on between president Chen Shui-bian and president Ma Ying-jiu in power. At last, combining the analysis result of two periods above-mentioned and two-level game theory, I make the conclusion for the development between Taiwan and China in the future. The result of the policy of cross-strait transportation is analysed in the period between president Chen Shui-bian and president Ma Ying-jiu, including two-level game theory and win-set. According to the inference with two-level gmae theory, thestudy brings up two-level game theory and win-set developing strategy, then makes a description how to adjust the the policy of cross-strait transportation between Taiwan and China in the two-level game theory’s factors considered. In the future, when the revelant policy is consulted, we should first consider the will of people, the present situation of economic development, and the national security. Especially the national security topic is the most important topic of cross-strait negotiations. With two sides' three direct links and other policies are carried out, it is under prerequisites that should improve people's welfare and stand state sovereignty in our country, and then carrying on the negotiation work of every open policy with China progressively . Key words : cross-strait transportation、the analysis of policy、two-level game theory
author2 Shu-Ming Hsu
author_facet Shu-Ming Hsu
Li-Ta Lan
藍立達
author Li-Ta Lan
藍立達
spellingShingle Li-Ta Lan
藍立達
The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
author_sort Li-Ta Lan
title The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
title_short The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
title_full The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
title_fullStr The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
title_full_unstemmed The Analysis of Cross-Strait Transportation Policy with Two-Level Game Theory
title_sort analysis of cross-strait transportation policy with two-level game theory
publishDate 2010
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/07139616905461598513
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