The Impact of Pay-Performance Sensitivity of High-Level Managers on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior and R&D Performance
碩士 === 東海大學 === 會計學系 === 98 === After the outbreak of the financial Tsunami, many companies still paid high bonus to high level managers, so government financial supervisory authorities required companies to pay managers’ compensation more closely linked to performance. According to prior literature...
Main Authors: | Meng-Jing Lin, 林孟瑾 |
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Other Authors: | Cheng-Jen Huang |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2010
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63960790109716421161 |
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