| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 98 === How to enhance company value under competitive environment is the issue that industry operator attaches much importance to. Previous studies indicated that good company governance system is beneficial for industry value enhancement. Most company governance issues are the agency problems of controlling shareholder to exploit minority shareholder. Therefore, we use controlling holder’s controlling right, cash flow right deviation, and the company management action involved by controlling shareholder to be company governance agency variances. Concerning industry value, EVA and MVA are used as evaluation basis, to investigate the industry value affected by controlling shareholder under different company governance mechanism.
This study is bases on Taiwan corporations trading in TSE and OTC market during 2004~2008. Empirical results demonstrate that when controlling shareholder is also the manager, the benefit and company become consistent, and cause incentives of industry management. Hence, when controlling shareholder is also the manager, the industry value enhances significantly. However, when controlling shareholder is involved in company governance action, and controlling right and cash flow right deviation exist at the same time, industry value will significantly decrease with the enhancement of deviation. That is, without the third party supervision and professional manager governance, controlling shareholder might perform actions which cause damage to the company under self consideration, and then industry value is reduced.
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