The Change of the Bush Administration’s Asian-Pacific Strategy Pre- and Post-“911”: An “Offensive Realism” Perspective

• Main Authors: Suen, Hao-Ren, 孫晧人
• Other Authors: Johnny Shaw
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85957334261127770417

碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 美國研究所 === 98 === Upon assuming the office in 2001, facing with the security uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region and the rise of China that might become the U. S.’s potential rivalry in the region prompted the Bush’s Administration to treat China as both a “strategic competitor” in the U. S.-Sino relationship and a primary axis of its Asia-Pacific security strategy. After the “9/11” incident and under its necessity to fight terrorism, the Bush government sought cooperation from the great powers in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, to form anti-terrorism coalitions. However, with the coalitions, the Bush government later garrisoned military forces in China’s backyard—the Central Asia, and suggested, in its 2006 National Security Strategy report, the potential threats from the great powers due to China’s military development in the region. This research explores the Bush Government’s cooperating and competing policy strategy, the contributing factors, and the change of its Asia-Pacific strategy after the “9/11 incident” within the realm of “Realism” and based on the core concept of the “Offensive Realism” approach, such as the unpredictable intentions among nations, the unavoidable conflicts, and regional hegemonies’ adoption of the “Offshore Balancing” strategy on external affairs. Under the “Offensive Realism” framework, it examines the revision of the Bush government’s Asia-Pacific strategy that embraced three major issues: 1) strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship as specified in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan; 2) solving the nuclear weapon crisis of the North Korea; and 3) coping with China’s rise, along with the residual effect of its Asia-Pacific strategic deployment. The research finds that, after the “9/11”, the U. S. relied more and more on its “Offshore Balancing” policy given its geographic feature and economic downturn. The Administration’s phased anti-terrorism coalition and cognitive Asian-Pacific strategy based on the “Offensive Realism” had not only aroused high concerns from China, the Central Asia, and the Southeast Asia, but also become its objective of containing the great powers in the Asia-Pacific region.