| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 國家發展研究所 === 98 === The goal of the study is to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait, particular focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises. The analytical framework of this study is to devise a test of the credibility of the U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Firstly, to use words and action-dimension to analyze the U.S. deterrence to China''s determination, and to test Washington’s determination to defend Taiwan''s security. Secondly, to use this framework to test China’s perception, and to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence.
This study employs this framework to explore the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China during 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait crises. We find that although United States did not show the same strong determination to deter China in the 1999 as that in 1996, China did perceive the U.S. determination eventually and took action to maintain the status quo. However, this study finds that during the most period of time China did not perceive the U.S. determination due to her unacceptable loss of Taiwan as Beijing’s core interests and American strategy of gradual escalation. The use of dual deterrence and reassurance by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait is able to reduce the sense of insecurity of Beijing and help resolve the problem of perception.
This study therefore concludes that if the U.S. continues to resist supporting Taiwan independence, and opposing the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, while Taiwan does not provoke Beijing, the credibility of American deterrence to China will be assured.
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