A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market

碩士 === 臺中技術學院 === 事業經營研究所 === 98 === Following the crisis of stock market, crime internationalized, and guilty operations, corporate governance is getting to be an important issue attracting investors’ attention. In order to strengthen corporate governance and the disclosure of information of listed...

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Main Authors: Mei-Yeh Wei, 魏梅葉
Other Authors: Cheng-Hwai Liou
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3epx4e
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spelling ndltd-TW-098NTTI51630122019-09-24T03:34:02Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3epx4e A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market 董監事及重要職員保險、公司治理與資本市場之研究 Mei-Yeh Wei 魏梅葉 碩士 臺中技術學院 事業經營研究所 98 Following the crisis of stock market, crime internationalized, and guilty operations, corporate governance is getting to be an important issue attracting investors’ attention. In order to strengthen corporate governance and the disclosure of information of listed companies, the Commissioner of Stock Exchange in Taiwan revisited the Item 26, Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Rule of Information Reporting of Listed Companies with Securities in December 2008:“The Company shall submit the detail of buying liability insurance for the directors and supervisors of the said Company within 15 days after the ending of current fiscal year.” This study is to detect the level of corporate governance and the accessibility of capital market of listed companies according to the status of buying director & officer’s liability insurance reporting to the Commissioner. The results showed that the coefficient of Tobin’s Q of the company with director & officer’s liability insurance was higher than that of the company without insurance. The companies which were more open, more intensive internal control and have transparent governance were less desire to purchase liability insurance. The companies with heavy institutional ownership and with many more number of directors had a higher proportion of buying director & officer’s liability insurance. As a paper, it is the first time to be an empirical study of corporate governance in Taiwan with the data of director & officer’s liability insurance and TCRI credit risk indicators. The results showed a surprising finding, for both of listed companies and off-listed ones which did not purchase director & officers’ liability insurance, their TCRI risk indicators were higher than those with insured companies. this is a corporate governance gap, it should be competent authority to improve can be a topic of follow-up study. Cheng-Hwai Liou 劉政淮 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 78 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 臺中技術學院 === 事業經營研究所 === 98 === Following the crisis of stock market, crime internationalized, and guilty operations, corporate governance is getting to be an important issue attracting investors’ attention. In order to strengthen corporate governance and the disclosure of information of listed companies, the Commissioner of Stock Exchange in Taiwan revisited the Item 26, Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Rule of Information Reporting of Listed Companies with Securities in December 2008:“The Company shall submit the detail of buying liability insurance for the directors and supervisors of the said Company within 15 days after the ending of current fiscal year.” This study is to detect the level of corporate governance and the accessibility of capital market of listed companies according to the status of buying director & officer’s liability insurance reporting to the Commissioner. The results showed that the coefficient of Tobin’s Q of the company with director & officer’s liability insurance was higher than that of the company without insurance. The companies which were more open, more intensive internal control and have transparent governance were less desire to purchase liability insurance. The companies with heavy institutional ownership and with many more number of directors had a higher proportion of buying director & officer’s liability insurance. As a paper, it is the first time to be an empirical study of corporate governance in Taiwan with the data of director & officer’s liability insurance and TCRI credit risk indicators. The results showed a surprising finding, for both of listed companies and off-listed ones which did not purchase director & officers’ liability insurance, their TCRI risk indicators were higher than those with insured companies. this is a corporate governance gap, it should be competent authority to improve can be a topic of follow-up study.
author2 Cheng-Hwai Liou
author_facet Cheng-Hwai Liou
Mei-Yeh Wei
魏梅葉
author Mei-Yeh Wei
魏梅葉
spellingShingle Mei-Yeh Wei
魏梅葉
A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
author_sort Mei-Yeh Wei
title A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
title_short A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
title_full A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
title_fullStr A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
title_full_unstemmed A Study of the Relationship among Director & Officer’s Liability Insurance, Corporate Governance, and Capital Market
title_sort study of the relationship among director & officer’s liability insurance, corporate governance, and capital market
publishDate 2010
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3epx4e
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