A Study on Marital Status and Mate Preference

碩士 === 國立臺北教育大學 === 社會與區域發展學系碩士班 === 98 === In our daily life, it is not hard to see “noble-like” singles with pretty good offers for being future mates, because the domestic marital patterns, late marriage and no marriage, increase daily. In this study, the author is to explore and discuss possible...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jiing-Heng Jeng, 鄭景蘅
Other Authors: 張榮富
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43880463930311468219
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Summary:碩士 === 國立臺北教育大學 === 社會與區域發展學系碩士班 === 98 === In our daily life, it is not hard to see “noble-like” singles with pretty good offers for being future mates, because the domestic marital patterns, late marriage and no marriage, increase daily. In this study, the author is to explore and discuss possible reasons that cause singles of the same age group to marry late, and to explore and discuss the reasons, he will use the market signaling theory of economics, and the exchange theory and the adjustment theory that are under the mate preference concept to form the framework of the essay. According to the “market signaling theory,” the author makes two kinds of assumptions as to reasons for the problem, why do singles of the same age group not marry. The assumptions are: 1. The singles of this age group are fussier about mate selection criteria than married people are. 2. What they can offer for being future mates is worse than what married people can offer. However, supporters of the “exchange theory” believe that a marriage is an exchange of resources between a male and a female, and in the marriage market, it can be easier for people having better social resources (youth, high social and economic status, or good looks) to exchange a spouse who can satisfy their own interests, with the resources that they have. Supporters of the “adjustment theory” argue that people will change according to social patterns, and will make corresponding adjustments on mate selection thresholds. People who are in a more disadvantageous position in choosing a mate in the marriage market will relax mate preference more than people in an advantageous position; on the contrary, people in a more advantageous position will be stricter on mate preference. The author also adapts a mate preference model of Dr. Jung-Fu Chang and designs questionnaires; he divides samples into eight groups according to sex and age, and based on four mate preferences, namely age upper and lower thresholds, height lower thresholds, lower thresholds of educational backgrounds, and lower thresholds of income, he demonstrates which of the abovementioned assumptions is correct. The result of the study shows that married people of the same age group are, in general, stricter on mate selection thresholds than unmarried people are. It also shows that the reasons that cause the singles of the same age group to marry late are possibly: What the singles can offer for being future mates is not as good as what married people can offer, or there are other factors. Aiming high and having strict mate selection criteria are not the reasons for the phenomenon.