Political Business Cycles and the Independence Index of Central Banks

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 中國與亞太區域研究所 === 98 === This article will verify whether the central banks create political business cycles or not. To refer to the Opportunistic Model operated by Leetouwer and Maier (2002), this research will expand the acquisition time of data till the fourth season of 2008, and a...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jing-wen Chen, 陳敬文
Other Authors: Yung-hsiang Ying
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/33570199513290795983
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 中國與亞太區域研究所 === 98 === This article will verify whether the central banks create political business cycles or not. To refer to the Opportunistic Model operated by Leetouwer and Maier (2002), this research will expand the acquisition time of data till the fourth season of 2008, and added Korea、Malaysia and Taiwan into the model. In this article, the independent variables will be the rates announced by central banks of these ten countries. The dependent variables will be the date of president/parliamentary elections and the independence of central bank to verify before the elections whether will the central banks create political business cycles through setting lower rate in monetary policy are pressured by rules or not. The empirical results show that: 1.The assumption of Central banks will use interest rates to create a political business cycle does not hold. This complements with Leetouwer and Maier’s results studied in 2002, the interest rate cannot be used as a tool to create political business cycle. 2. The higher independence of central bank, the interest rate introduced by central bank will be lower, and as well as the inflation rate.