The Symmetric Egalitarian solution and random arrival rule
博士 === 國立東華大學 === 應用數學系 === 98 === We extended the Shapley value from TU games to both multi- choice NTU games and bankruptcy problems here. In Chapter 1, we follow Kalai and Samets' (1985) construction to de ne a possible extension of the egalitarian solutions to multichoice NTU games, i.e., N...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2010
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51548183286838107638 |
| Summary: | 博士 === 國立東華大學 === 應用數學系 === 98 === We extended the Shapley value from TU games to both multi-
choice NTU games and bankruptcy problems here. In Chapter 1,
we follow Kalai and Samets' (1985) construction to de ne a possible
extension of the egalitarian solutions to multichoice NTU games, i.e.,
NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several
levels of activity. We show that in the presence of some weak axioms
the egalitarian solutions are the only monotonic ones in the context
of multichoice NTU games.
In Chapter 2, since the extended value to bankruptcy problems
is random arrival rule, we characterize the random arrival rule by
means of CG-consistency and population monotonicity in bankruptcy
problems here.
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