The Optimal Pricing Scheme of the Firm in the Online Game Industry

• Main Authors: Yi-shuo Lee, 李宜朔
• Other Authors: Dach-rahn Wu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68131775831429932037

碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 98 === This research proposes a model to analyze a firm’s pricing strategy and the related social welfare effect in the monopolistic online game market. In the case that the market is partially-covered, we derive that if the quality cost of the online game decreases, if the development cost of the instrument decreases or if the population of the potential consumers increases, then the firm raises the entry fee and reduces the instrument prices. In the case that the market is fully-covered, the firm sets a higher entry fee and provides the instruments for free if the development cost of the instrument is very low or if the population of potential consumers is large. Regarding the issue of network effects, we find that indirect network effect exists when the market is partially-covered, and does not exist when the market is fully-covered. Finally, we show that, from the social planer’s point of view, the quality of the online game provided by the monopolistic firm is too high when the market is partially-covered; and is appropriate when the market is fully-covered.