CEO Incentive Pay, Auditor Attributes: Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 會計學研究所 === 98 === In this study, we focus on the agency problem caused by CEO executive stock option and the choice of Big N auditors, non-audit fees and audit opinion. Corporate scandals result in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 which significantly influence on aud...
Main Authors: | I-Wen Lin, 林宜文 |
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Other Authors: | Chia-chi Lu |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2010
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51389413175961049949 |
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