| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 管理科學系所 === 98 === Many scholars indicate that firms after SEO announcement would sustain long term negative performance for more than three years. However, if firms increase (decrease) its’ dividend payout would result in positive (negative) return in the long run. Recently, the topic of corporate governance is more and more important; we add the element of corporate governance, combine the agency problems and asymmetric problems, and we concern whether would firms with better corporate governance mechanism tend to pay dividends and have better long-term performance after SEO announcement. Categorizing by dividend policy and corporate governance, this paper utilize SEO firms from 1992 to 2004 as samples, and examines the long run performance.
We find the dividend-paying firms perform better than the non-dividend-paying firms. And the better corporate governance mechanism firms perform better than the poor corporate governance mechanism firms. Besides, under the outcome hypothesis of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), we find the long term performance of SEOs firms with poor corporate governance mechanism and zero dividend yield must exist significant negative return for two years, no matter calculated by buy and hold abnormal returns or Fama-French three-factor model. Compared with the better corporate governance mechanism and dividend-paying firms, there exist less negative return, even exist some significant positive return.
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