| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班資訊管理組 === 98 === Information System Outsourcing (ISO) has become one of the most useful strategies for enterprises. In order to chase the enormous profit in a short period, no matter public governments or private enterprises coincidentally select ISO as their major strategy. However, the result doesn’t achieve a satisfied agreement between enterprises and its associated outsourcing agencies according to recent reports. Although the sales grow as a positive proportion, the satisfaction of service level doesn’t reach the same outcome. On the contrary, service level may be suitable for enterprise; however, the enterprises’ sale expectation could not be achieved. In conclusion, from a long term aspect, ISO may not gain much profit as enterprises expect if the quality and quantity controls are not able to be implemented comprehensively.
This study utilizes a game theoretic model to predict the strategic behaviors of different associated outsourcing agencies. In addition, this study uses a self-supervision method to control the scheduled progress of associated agencies. The strategy for the associated outsourcing agencies is to obey or to violate the contract. In order to establish a win-win outcome, understanding interaction factors could prevent a future failure from selecting inappropriate strategies. This study builds a feasible interactive model to analyze, predict and help both enterprises and a software outsourcing vendor to build a better relationship and to gain the optimal profit for each other.
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