| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 98 === Abstract
This paper investigates whether the policy enhances employers’ incentive to hiring the individuals with criminal record and reduces the recidivist rate, that the government purchases insurance against the loss the employer could from suffer hiring ex-convicts. Recently, some countries in Western world and Asia have established the policy that is similar to Federal Bonding Program to help the individuals with record be employed. Tracing this trend, the study explores the inmates’ incentives to and choices of being rehabilitated. Then, referring to the setup of Federal Bonding Program, we apply the basic model of principal-agent to analyze if the policy is doable. We establish the conditions that the policy can reduce employers’ risk in hiring ex-convicted and promote ex-convicts’ willingness to participate in legal activities. We reach the three results, clarifying what the information is asymmetric from government’s point of view and ex-convict’s true perception about the incentive to participating in legal activities. First, FBP lifts the employment rate of the ex-convicts who are without incentive to repeating offense, and does not affect their possibility of recommitting the acts. Second, if the ex-convicts have incentive to repeating offense in lower opportunity cost, the policy does not affect their decision of joining in the legal labor market, and they recommit the act. Finally, if the ex-convicts have incentive to repeating offense in high opportunity cost, the policy affects their effort of participating in legal activities.
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