Spectrum Leasing Game for Cognitive Radio Networks in a Primary System With Adaptive Modulation Schemes

• Main Authors: Yu-PingLin, 林裕評
• Other Authors: Chih-Wen Chang
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25568699412943607225

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 電腦與通信工程研究所 === 98 === In this thesis, we address the issue of spectrum leasing in the cognitive radio (CR) networks through a game-theoretical approach. In the proposed game model, the primary system using adaptive modulation schemes can lease the licensed spectrum to the secondary one on the condition of not being dropping out, while a secondary system can request an amount of power to transmit in the channel which is leased from the primary one. Thus, a primary user (PU), as being a seller, can determine the optimal leasing price to maximize its revenue at a cost of minimal throughput degradation. Meanwhile, a secondary user (SU), as being a buyer, can allocate the optimal transmission power to maximize its throughput at a minimum payment. As illustrated by the simulation results, the proposed spectrum leasing game can converge to a unique Nash equilibrium in a decentralized way, and the SUs can have chances to transmit causing slight impacts on the transmission modes of the PUs. Moreover, to verify the proposed spectrum leasing game, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibria are also proved. Some interesting research topics for the future are listed at the end of this thesis.