A Game Theory Approach to Simulate Hillside Development Decision Making Processes

• Main Authors: Chooi-MeiMah, 馬翠眉
• Other Authors: Nang-Fei Pan
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13708578505210975684

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 土木工程學系碩博士班 === 98 === Unmanaged hillside development causing environmental, social and economic problems which often link to mismanagement and low maintenance which triggered landslide. Increased environmental awareness focused attention on the move towards a sustainable pattern of development. Stakeholders with different attitudes, expectation, development goals and utility made the collective decision-making more complicated. Interdependency between stakeholders’ decision further escalate the complexity. Conflicts reduce the wellbeing of the stakeholders in term of benefits, which implies a reduction of the economic growth. Due to the nature of hillside development, conflicts may produce an unsustainable use of land and where the economic and social consequences are generally difficult to foresee. Scientific criteria for managing hillside development do not focused on decision making processes and attempts in this regard are seriously compromised amongst other things by the lack of effective and reliable tools for decision making. To understand the interaction of decision making processes, it is important to analyze how the decisions of the stakeholders are interrelated and how those decisions derives to the outcome. Hence, this study employ game theoretical model as an analytical tool with the main objective of this research is to investigate the usefulness of game theoretical modeling in analyzing and predicting the behaviors of actors in decision-making processes with respect to the hillside development. Game theoretical model provides a better understanding with logic analysis on the issue highlighted. Model constructed around the strategic choices available to players, where the preferred outcomes are clearly defined and known. With this, the equilibriums which satisfy the stakeholders can be achieved in every possible combination of strategies. Game modeling focused on the incomplete information games in which the players’ belief in the landslide likelihood is important belief for their choice. Statistical and economic regression used to elucidate the payoff functions, cost benefits analysis to evaluate the total payoff and to compare the game outcomes on how to reach a cooperative game with government intervention. The validity of game model will be evaluated by comparing the predictions with surveys. Key findings suggested that cooperation game would make both players collectively better off. However, given the uncertainties of the nature aspect of landslide likelihood and both players are profit-driven minded, they are deemed to be unwilling to play cooperating game in the beginning. Clear cooperative signals will be helpful in maximizing payoffs, where the outcome of conflict must be the product of their joint requirements and the interaction of their separate choices. Results demonstrated that game theory help decision-makers to identify the key strategic decision associated with uncertainties. Series of implementation from government included enforcement and encouragement to maximize payoffs. The limitations of this study, in particular, the assumptions underlying the model development. However, to conclude, game theory possessed as a useful decision support tool in simulating different scenarios and provides a clearer view on trade-off and payoff of the strategic interaction complexity.