The equivalence of tariffs and quotas: an application of political contributions

• Main Authors: Tsai, Teng-Wei, 蔡騰緯
• Other Authors: Wang, Jue-Shyan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ru5yc8

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 財政研究所 === 98 === This paper applies the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and analyzes how the domestic and foreign firms may influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy via political contributions. Besides, we can examine whether the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, may in fact hold or not given the political contributions. It is shown that in the case of no campaign contributions, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold. Furthermore, when the firms in the two countries lobby by political contributions, the domestic government will adopt a tariff policy except some special case. Then the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold.