| Summary: | 碩士 === 崑山科技大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 98 === The aim of this dissertation is to study about the influence of the differently composed board of directors and ownership structure dimensions on accounting and market performance in Taiwan. Thereby, the data of the over 1082 listed companies in Taiwan within the period from 2005 to 2008 are analyzed by the regression method.
For board of directors’ dimensions, results show that board of directors’ size, board independent directors’ size, board of supervisors’ size, outside block–holder and CEO belonging to controlled family all significantly positively affect on accounting performance. Meanwhile, chairman and CEO dual, chairman turnover, CEO turnover and chairman belonging to controlled family all significantly negatively affect on accounting performance. Market performance is significantly positively affected by CEO turnover but significantly negatively affected by chairman belonging to controlled family. Outside block–holder and dual CEO have no significant effect on market performance. On the other hand, board of directors’ size, board of independent directors’ size, board of supervisors’ size and CEO belonging to controlled family show mixing effects on market performance.
For ownership structure dimensions, institution shareholding, directors’ shareholding, managers’ shareholding, chairman shareholding, CEO shareholding, domestic financial shareholding and domestic trust institutions’ shareholding all significantly positively affect on accounting performance while supervisors’ shareholding and block-holders’ shareholding significantly negatively affect on it. Only foreign shareholding has mixing results affecting on accounting performance and government shareholding has no significant on accounting performance. Market performance is significantly positively affected by institution shareholding, managers’ shareholding, block-holders’ shareholding, chairman shareholding, CEO shareholding and domestic trust institutions shareholding while it is significantly negatively affected by supervisors’ shareholding and domestic financial shareholding. Foreign shareholding, government shareholding and directors’ shareholding have mixing results affecting on market performance.
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