The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys

碩士 === 義守大學 === 財務金融學系碩士班 === 98 === Agency costs has been the main core issues of corporate governance. Few studies estimate the cost of agent question. This article focuses on the implementation of domestic listed companies in corporate governance measures are estimated to reduce agency costs, thu...

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Main Authors: Chia-Ling Chang, 張嘉玲
Other Authors: Yi-Ran Jia
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78611429428176002896
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spelling ndltd-TW-098ISU052140252015-10-13T18:25:52Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78611429428176002896 The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys 代理成本之測量-隨機邊界模型分析 Chia-Ling Chang 張嘉玲 碩士 義守大學 財務金融學系碩士班 98 Agency costs has been the main core issues of corporate governance. Few studies estimate the cost of agent question. This article focuses on the implementation of domestic listed companies in corporate governance measures are estimated to reduce agency costs, thus enabling companies improve performance and value. This paper from 2005 to 2008 listed firms, according to Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) study using the stochastic frontier model, from the company analysis of both internal and external governance managers incentive effect on firm performance. First, the agency cost estimate ratio of listed companies is about 21%. Second, the external excitation, the product market pressure has significant influence. But capital market pressures related to negatively correlation. Third, internal excitation, the manager''s remuneration rate, the manager shareholding ratio, institutional ownership ratios were significantly positive correlation, term of office managers was negative correlation, major shareholders holding ratio was no significant relationship. Yi-Ran Jia 賈毅然 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 70 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
format Others
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description 碩士 === 義守大學 === 財務金融學系碩士班 === 98 === Agency costs has been the main core issues of corporate governance. Few studies estimate the cost of agent question. This article focuses on the implementation of domestic listed companies in corporate governance measures are estimated to reduce agency costs, thus enabling companies improve performance and value. This paper from 2005 to 2008 listed firms, according to Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) study using the stochastic frontier model, from the company analysis of both internal and external governance managers incentive effect on firm performance. First, the agency cost estimate ratio of listed companies is about 21%. Second, the external excitation, the product market pressure has significant influence. But capital market pressures related to negatively correlation. Third, internal excitation, the manager''s remuneration rate, the manager shareholding ratio, institutional ownership ratios were significantly positive correlation, term of office managers was negative correlation, major shareholders holding ratio was no significant relationship.
author2 Yi-Ran Jia
author_facet Yi-Ran Jia
Chia-Ling Chang
張嘉玲
author Chia-Ling Chang
張嘉玲
spellingShingle Chia-Ling Chang
張嘉玲
The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
author_sort Chia-Ling Chang
title The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
title_short The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
title_full The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
title_fullStr The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
title_full_unstemmed The measurement of Agency cost:A Stochastic Froniter Analys
title_sort measurement of agency cost:a stochastic froniter analys
publishDate 2010
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78611429428176002896
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