Implementation of Power Analysis Attack and Countermeasure

• Main Authors: Yang-Cheng Chuang, 莊揚程
• Other Authors: Kuan-Jen Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34237553960592072646

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 電子工程學系 === 98 === Embedded systems such as smart- and sim- cards use cryptographic algorithms to protect information security. The power consumption of executing a cryptographic program is correlated with the secret key and intermediate data. The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack collects power consumption traces and uses statistical analysis to find the key. This attack has been considered as the most dangerous attack to the security of cryptographic embedded systems. In this work, DPA attack was implemented and used to successfully attack an AES program running on an 8051-microprossor. A user-friendly interface was built to allow users conveniently simulating the DPA attacks. In our experiment, the total 128 bits of an AES secret key can be revealed within 12 minutes using our attacking platform. We also compared the efficiency between the two analyzing techniques, correlation coefficient and difference of mean. Furthermore, a countermeasure against DPA is proposed and implemented in an AES encryption program. The experimental result shows that the countermeasure significantly increases the resistance to DPA attacks.