The Legislative Making Process Analysis of Taiwan''s National Pension Institutions：The View of Veto Players Theory

• Main Authors: Chien-Hsun Chu, 朱建勳
• Other Authors: Chuan-Ching Hwang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82191138620349573906

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 社會工作系碩士班 === 98 === The Purpose of this study is application the veto players theory viewpoint to explore the outcome of Taiwan’s National Pension making process. To start off the point is be able to explain why Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Institution could complete legislative in 1994, however, the National Pension Institution which was stimulating dispute for Taiwan Welfare State issue were completed legislative until in 2007？ and what reasons for that can not bring all national into it？ Recently, the orientation of veto mechanism was to getting more attentively in Welfare Develop Theory, especially for George Tsebelis’s Veto Players Theory. It is quite discussing in modern political science and the study of comparative institution. The research approach is mainly analysis through of polity institution and preference of all actors to identify those who are veto players, and how to interaction between them to influence policy outcome. The study is noticeable on process rather than policy content. Taiwan’s academic community have been seldom application veto players theory to discuss in public policy, especially in the field of social policy, this study is hope to fill the shortage of this field. The veto player theory uses in this study while starting from vertical dimention to divided 4 stages which describing the historical outcomes of Taiwan’s National Pension act process. And then, analyzing the actors’s power、preference and whole veto players theory structure in every stage from cross section. In order to apply this theory, firstly, according to Taiwan’s Constitution regulation and the legislative passing process identify those who are institutional veto players. Secondly, through for analyzing various actors who can control the political power and preference to further explore the role of partisan and other type veto players. Finally, application the absorption rule to combine in veto players theory, next to illustration veto players spatial structure. This study shows that in depth analyzing the numbers of Taiwan’s political institution、distance of preference and internal cohesion, it seems that more than other Welfare Developing Theory to explain the reason why Taiwan’s National Pension Institution forming today’s content and then why repeatedly delayed the legislative time.