The Decision Making Process of U.S. Hands-off Policy: From Announcement to Adjustment (January 5-June 27, 1950)

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所碩士班 === 97 === With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, it not only scuttled the grand strategy of the United States in Asia, but also changed the fate of the Chiang Kai-shek’s administration afterwards. As soon as the Korean War broke out, President Harry S. Truman...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chia-Huang Yuan, 袁嘉鍠
Other Authors: 陳一新
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51035277765092535402
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Summary:碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所碩士班 === 97 === With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, it not only scuttled the grand strategy of the United States in Asia, but also changed the fate of the Chiang Kai-shek’s administration afterwards. As soon as the Korean War broke out, President Harry S. Truman ordered the 7th fleet to move to the Taiwan Strait so as to implement the policy of “Neutralization of the Straits of Formosa.” Such move was nothing but a change of hands-off policy toward Taiwan. Therefore the main purpose of this thesis is to explore what the decision maker, organizations and main participants had in mind in their policy toward Taiwan before and after the Korean War broke out. By applying Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Government Politics Model (GPM), this thesis will focus on the U.S. policy toward Taiwan before and after the Korean War broke out from the perspective of the national interest, the competition between organizations, and bureaucratic politics. Analyzing from the perspective of RAM, the thesis finds that U.S. Taiwan policy was made under the precondition of “containing the Communism to spread.” Therefore, it is the reason why the Truman administration ordered the 7th fleet to move to the Taiwan Strait immediately after the Korean War broke out. It is just some kind of expediency for the U.S. to protect its own national interest. From the perspective of OBM, the thesis find that no matter what kind of competition (intra- or inter- organization) between State Department and the military, the State Department was the only winner. Even the military successfully asked President Truman send 7th Fleet to move to protect Formosa, owing to lacking of some kind of economic-aid package to help Chiang’s administration, the military was nothing but the loser eventually. Analyzing from the perspective of GPM, the thesis finds that by depending on his good relationship with President Truman Secretary of State Dean Acheson could easily get the upper hand in U.S. Taiwan policy. To sum, the main theme of this thesis is that U.S. Taiwan policy, from hands-off policy to the dispatch of the 7th fleet to protect Formosa, depended on the changes of outer international environment. The reason why Chiang Kai-shek’s administration could survive largely because the Truman administration wanted to protect U.S. national security and interest, not because he wanted to help Chiang Kai-shek to retake mainland China.