The Decision Making Process of U.S.-Japan Confrontation Prior to the Attack of Pearl Harbor

• Main Authors: Jian-Bang Zeng, 曾建邦
• Other Authors: 陳ㄧ新
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87565555048037445642

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所碩士班 === 97 === Prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States endeavored to smooth over problems between Japan and the U.S. Basically, Japan’s “southward policy” conflicted with America’s foreign policy. The Roosevelt Administration maintained what I call “postponement policy” and hoped to defer the hostilities. In the end, the U.S. still could not stop the hostilities at the expense of its own national interests. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to explore the decision-making process of the Roosevelt Administration prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor. This thesis is under the framework of Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), from the perspective of the Roosevelt Administration’s national interests, organizational culture and capability, and bureaucratic bargaining. To start with RAM, the Roosevelt Administration needed supporting Britain to resist Germany because the U.S. viewed the European War as its top priority. At the same time, the U.S. endeavored to defer Japan to go to war, and inclined to maintain the status quo in the Far East. As for OBM, Department of State (DOS) and Department of War (DOW) had different position and opinions due to the unique organizational culture and capabilities. DOS had rich foreign affairs experience and handled the problems with standard operation procedures. In this way, DOS insisted on its position and then could not achieve the breakthrough in the U.S.-Japan talks. Besides, DOW only offered limited military strength to the Fast East because of insufficient military force. Accordingly, DOW was unable to respond the crisis timely in the Pacific. With regard to GPM, President Roosevelt insisted a postponement policy must be maintained between the U.S. and Japan, having no desire to take military action against Japan. Hence, the U.S. only strived for time and hoped to prevent Japan from going to war. Consequently, the U.S. maintained a conversation with Japan, and deferred the bilateral hostilities to escalate as possible as it could, but eventually it could not but go to the Pacific War after the Pearl Harbor was attacked.