| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 97 === The objectives of the government designing license auctions should take value efficiency, government revenue, social welfare, bidding profit, as well as the number of entrants entering the market into account. This thesis designs heterogeneous goods multi-rounds auction which is based on the existing license auction system. We simulate telecommunications market structure in current Taiwan and assume bidders’ valuation derived from affiliated valuation model. Therefore, we conducted the experiments and analyze the data of subjects in order to find out whether the current spectrum auction system is appropriate or not.
Bidders have to afford high information cost in the assessment of the market value of spectrum. Our experimental results show that allocation efficiency will decline as long as valuation includes more uncertainty.
Nowadays, the wireless communication technology advances continuously. Bidders under incomplete information are easily over-optimistic about their revenue; consequently, they bid to high then will suffer financial loss in the future. It is also demonstrated in our experimental results.
In the telecommunications market, the ability between incumbents and entrants is asymmetric. Our experimental results show the government takes measures to protect entrants, which can serve multiple purposes. Not only can it make more entrants enter the market, but also enhance allocation efficiency. The reaching rate of the largest producer surplus slightly increases in contrast that the occurrence of winner's curse slightly declines, in particular in entrants. However, license fees are still considerable.
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