The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in China: A Bureaucratic Competition Approach
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 97 === This thesis attempts to expound the concept of central bank independence (CBI) in China. By using the bureaucratic competition approach, the writer tries to reconstruct the developmental path of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) in the financial reform era from 199...
Main Authors: | Xiu-Lin Zeng, 曾秀琳 |
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Other Authors: | 陶儀芬 |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2009
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56610750455368407149 |
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