Delegation, Patent Licensing and Strategic Trade Policy-Game Theory Applications

• Main Authors: Pei-Ling, Chen, 陳佩鈴
• Other Authors: Shiou, Shieh
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96372230256365969922

博士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 97 === This dissertation consists of three separate, while related, articles. The first essay in Chapter 2, “Firm Numbers, Input Pricing and Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically-related Industry”, studies issues related to optimal trade policies in a vertically-related market with an upstream monopolist supplying a key intermediate good to downstream oligopoly firms that are located in two countries. The numbers of downstream firms in the two countries are different. We show that the optimal trade policies in downstream countries depend not only on the upstream monopolist’s pricing schemes, discriminatory or uniform, but also on the relative size of numbers of firms in both downstream countries. Our results yield interesting comparisons with those in Bernhofen (1997), in which optimal trade policies are examined in a setup that each downstream country only has on firm competing with each other in the final good market. The second essay in Chapter 3, “Input Pricing, Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically-related Industry”, deals specifically with relative-performance delegation and trade policies in a vertically-related industry. We show that the optimal government intervention in the final-good market depends upon both the pricing scheme employed by the intermediate-good producer as well as the relative product differential if owners of firms have sufficient control over their managers’ behavior. The third essay in Chapter 4, “Patent Licensing under Relative-performance Delegation”, revisits Saracho (2002) to analyze the effects of delegation on patent licensing. Our model differs with Saracho (2002) in the treatment of delegation. In specific, we employ the relative-performance delegation, proposed by Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002), to examine patent licensing. Our results show that patent licensing strategies of an outsider patent holder varies with the degree of product differentiation.