A Study on the Relationship between Complementary Measures of Expensing Employee Bonus Plan and Earnings Management
碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 企業管理學系研究所 === 97 === Based on the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.39, the employee bonus plan is treated as an expense item rather than earnings distribution of a firm. The empirical study examines the relationship between complementary measures of expensing employee...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
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2009
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/fcb434 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 企業管理學系研究所 === 97 === Based on the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.39, the employee bonus plan is treated as an expense item rather than earnings distribution of a firm. The empirical study examines the relationship between complementary measures of expensing employee bonus plan and earnings management. This research hypothesizes that managers will have stronger incentives to manage earnings when the new regulation will start to implement. This research empirically tests the differences in earnings management behaviors between Taiwanese technology firms and Taiwanese nontechnology firms.
This research used the Modified Jones model (1995) to measure the discretionary accruals and design a regression model to testify empirical tests. This research also used pair t-test to examining the mean difference tests. The empirical results indicate that there is a significant difference between the dummy variable for industry classification and discretionary accruals. There is a significant positive relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings. There is a significant negative relationship between discretionary accruals and cash flow from operations. There is a significant difference between the discretionary accruals and administrative expenses.
There is a strong connection between new regulation and managers’ bonus. In order to protect their self-interests, the results show the changeable of earnings management behaviors.
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