The Effect of Family Ownership, Control and Management on Capital Structure

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 財務管理所 === 97 === The main objective of this study investigates the effect of family ownership, the separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and management on capital structure. The sample includes listed companies in Taiwan of family firms from 1998 to 2007. We use th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yi-Ling Chen, 陳怡伶
Other Authors: Hsiang-Lan Chen
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56987827313789929125
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 財務管理所 === 97 === The main objective of this study investigates the effect of family ownership, the separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and management on capital structure. The sample includes listed companies in Taiwan of family firms from 1998 to 2007. We use the multiple regression model to exam our data. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between family ownership and debt ratio is negative because they desire to control risk. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between cash flow rights and control rights. Therefore the empirical results support non-dilution entrenchment effect and signaling effect of debt. It implies that if there is a large deviation between cash flow rights and control rights, the family shareholders may increase corporate debt level. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between management and debt ratio is negative. It implies that if the manager belong to family member may decrease corporate debt level because professionals are not easy to enter the company. Therefore the corporate performance is decreasing and the cost of debt financing is increasing. According to the empirical results given above, family ownership, control and management will indeed have an effect on capital structure.