Compensation, Director Network, and Firm Performance

• Main Authors: Jen-Fu Cheng, 鄭人輔
• Other Authors: Ying-Fen Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73713563600643443366

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 公司理財碩士學位學程 === 97 === This paper investigates whether director compensation or director network associates with the executive compensation, and the influence to future performance. In order to understanding the variations between family and not family firms , the investigation also separates the sample firms into family and not-family firms. This study investigates a sample of listed companies from 2004 to 2007, adopts summary statistics, correlation and multiple regression analysis to measure the relativity. The conclusions of the empirical investigation are listed below . First, with greater director compensation, firms would pay more executive compensation, and have better future performance. This finding suggests that firms pay more compensation to employ more professional executives or directors when firms are harder to operate and govern. Second, with greater director network, all sample firms and family firms would pay more executive compensation and have better future performance. This finding suggests that family firms are network governance system that family firms can apply network to get outside information and resources, abate risk level and adapt social norms.