The Relationship between Grant effect of Executive Stock Options and Firm Performance
碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 商業教育學系 === 97 === This paper was focused on the executive stock option (ESO) granted effect on earnings management and firm unmanaged performance. Because the regulation of ESO that ESO did not exercise in two years vesting period, we separated the executives’ incentive ratio of...
Main Author: | 陳意君 |
---|---|
Other Authors: | 吳明政 |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2009
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12344499490377655632 |
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