The Relationship between Grant effect of Executive Stock Options and Firm Performance

• Main Author: 陳意君
• Other Authors: 吳明政
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12344499490377655632

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 商業教育學系 === 97 === This paper was focused on the executive stock option (ESO) granted effect on earnings management and firm unmanaged performance. Because the regulation of ESO that ESO did not exercise in two years vesting period, we separated the executives’ incentive ratio of ESO valuation into three parts, the granted year、the year after granted year and the exercised year. Our research used executives’ compensation incentive to investigate whether the ESO leaded executives to engage in earnings management or not, and whether the ESO leaded firm’s unmanaged performance better or not. The empirical result showed the ESO really leaded executives to engage in earnings management. Besides, the ESO in the excised year was positive in firm unmanaged performance, this evidence also showed the ESO was really to encourage employees and raise firm unmanaged performance.