| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 電機與控制工程系所 === 97 === We present security analysis of process control systems (PCS) when an attacker can compromise sensor measurements that are critical for maintaining the operational goals. We present the general sensor attack model that can represent a wide variety of integrity attacks. By taking example of a well studied process control system, we discuss the consequences of sensor attacks on the performance of the system and important implications for designing defense actions. We develop model-based detection methods that can be tuned to limit the false-alarm rates while detecting a large class of sensor attacks. From the attacker's viewpoint, we show that when the detection mechanisms and control system operations are understood by the attacker, it can carry stealth attacks that maximize the chance of missed detection. From the defender's viewpoint, we show that when an attack is detected, the use of model-based outputs maintains safety under compromised sensor measurements.
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