| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 工業工程與管理系所 === 97 === Due to environmental concerns and legislative requirements, the disposition of end-of-life electronics products is attracting tremendous attention nowadays. We present a Stackelberg-typed model to determine the socially optimal subsidy and advanced recycling fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests.
Our model consists of the government, as a leader, and two followers, a group of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MIS), and a group of recyclers. To maximize the social welfare, the government determines the advanced recycling fee paid by MIS and the subsidy fee subsidizing recyclers when MIS sell or recyclers process a unit of products. This paper compares performances of the social welfare model and current practice with identical tax revenue in a monopoly market. Then, we demonstrate that our result outperforms the current practice by a numerical case. Furthermore, we relax the assumption of the monopoly market and investigate the model with multiple entities in each market. We discuss the optimal number determination of recyclers with homogeneous entities and illustrate the model procedure by a numerical case.
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