R&D Competition under Patent Licensing

• Main Authors: Zhi-wei Yin, 殷志偉
• Other Authors: 翁明宏
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78581126042247997645

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 經濟學系碩博士班 === 97 === We discuss how the patent licensing may impact the R&D activities of duopoly firms with different production costs. We found that: with the possibility of patent licensing, the more efficient firms will spend more in R&D, and the less efficient one will spend less, when it is more difficult to innovate. As a result, the patent licensing widens the difference in firms’ production costs. Besides, the incentive to innovate for either firm decreases under patent licensing as the original gap between costs increases. Moreover, when comparing to the R&D cooperation, both firms will be engaged in more R&D activities under patent licensing, when the difference between costs is relative small.