The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs
碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 高階經理人碩士在職專班 === 97 === This thesis studies information asymmetric problems and incentive mechanism designs for National Pension Fund of Taiwan as well as provides suggestions for strengthening the Fund’s operation efficiency. Regarding information asymmetric problems, we can find s...
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ndltd-TW-097NCHU54570732015-11-13T04:04:46Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89812091636166331941 The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs 退休基金監理與誘因設計--以勞退基金為例 Chi-Chang Tsai 蔡其昌 碩士 國立中興大學 高階經理人碩士在職專班 97 This thesis studies information asymmetric problems and incentive mechanism designs for National Pension Fund of Taiwan as well as provides suggestions for strengthening the Fund’s operation efficiency. Regarding information asymmetric problems, we can find some problems from its supervisory. The execution hierarchy of the Organizational Act of the Labor Pension Fund Supervisory Committee is too low and its lack of independence, so it’s too hard to resist all kind of the political intervention and pressure. The regulation is inadequate and it’s difficult to cut off the political abuses, lead to agency problem which cause the high cost and risk and the inefficiency outcome of supervisory. Second, about the problem of incentive insufficiency, because of the lack of statement of investment policy, it’s hard to set suit asset allocation, seek the best investment performance, reduce the decision risk, improve transparency and attract the excellent manager and the team of the delegation for designated management of the pension fund. For the above-mentioned problems, this paper provides some possible way of our country’s labor pension fund: 1. establish statement of investment policy, 2. set up public and transparent information system, 3. built up the labor’s delegate election which is high representative and can improve the information transparency, 4.connect the performance and salary and employ the outstanding managers, 5. clearly regulate the law to reduce the political abuse and judicature risk, 6. found independent accountant or actuary who is a role of whistleblowers, 7. join the corporation government which the fund invested For the investment trust and consulting institution join the delegation for designated management of the government pension fund, there are two main incentives, 1. compensation, 2. reputation. Therefore, raising the compensation maybe can improve the incentives while have to unify the standard about the raising the compensation. In addition, the government should retire the fund which the trust and consulting institutions have poor manage and also announce the information. Under the carrot and the stick, we hope to invite the best investment trust and consulting institutions and the excellent fund managers to make the best effort for our country’s pension fund. 林盈課 2009 學位論文 ; thesis 50 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 高階經理人碩士在職專班 === 97 === This thesis studies information asymmetric problems and incentive mechanism designs for National Pension Fund of Taiwan as well as provides suggestions for strengthening the Fund’s operation efficiency. Regarding information asymmetric problems, we can find some problems from its supervisory. The execution hierarchy of the Organizational Act of the Labor Pension Fund Supervisory Committee is too low and its lack of independence, so it’s too hard to resist all kind of the political intervention and pressure. The regulation is inadequate and it’s difficult to cut off the political abuses, lead to agency problem which cause the high cost and risk and the inefficiency outcome of supervisory. Second, about the problem of incentive insufficiency, because of the lack of statement of investment policy, it’s hard to set suit asset allocation, seek the best investment performance, reduce the decision risk, improve transparency and attract the excellent manager and the team of the delegation for designated management of the pension fund.
For the above-mentioned problems, this paper provides some possible way of our country’s labor pension fund: 1. establish statement of investment policy, 2. set up public and transparent information system, 3. built up the labor’s delegate election which is high representative and can improve the information transparency, 4.connect the performance and salary and employ the outstanding managers, 5. clearly regulate the law to reduce the political abuse and judicature risk, 6. found independent accountant or actuary who is a role of whistleblowers, 7. join the corporation government which the fund invested
For the investment trust and consulting institution join the delegation for designated management of the government pension fund, there are two main incentives, 1. compensation, 2. reputation. Therefore, raising the compensation maybe can improve the incentives while have to unify the standard about the raising the compensation. In addition, the government should retire the fund which the trust and consulting institutions have poor manage and also announce the information. Under the carrot and the stick, we hope to invite the best investment trust and consulting institutions and the excellent fund managers to make the best effort for our country’s pension fund.
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author2 |
林盈課 |
author_facet |
林盈課 Chi-Chang Tsai 蔡其昌 |
author |
Chi-Chang Tsai 蔡其昌 |
spellingShingle |
Chi-Chang Tsai 蔡其昌 The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
author_sort |
Chi-Chang Tsai |
title |
The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
title_short |
The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
title_full |
The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
title_fullStr |
The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Supervision of Pension Funds and Incentive Designs |
title_sort |
supervision of pension funds and incentive designs |
publishDate |
2009 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89812091636166331941 |
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