An empirical study on determinant factors of the intensiveness of board monitoring

• Main Author: 邱筱茜
• Other Authors: 汪泱若
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51293408579551194244

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 97 === Prior researches argue that board meeting time is an important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board (e.g., Vafeas, 1999; Ryan et al., 2007). We use a Poisson model with the number of board meetings as the dependent variable and examine the determinant factors of the intensiveness of board monitoring. We find that the intensiveness of board monitoring is driven by CEO characteristics, board characteristics, and prior performance. CEO tenure, CEO ownership, board size and prior performance are significantly inversely related to the intensiveness of board monitoring. CEO/chair duality positively influences the number of meetings (significant at the 0.1 level). We analyze separately the relations between CEO characteristics, board characteristics, prior performance and meeting frequency for non-family CEOs and CEOs who are numbers of the controlling family, and use interaction term between independent proxies and the controlling family dummy variable to test for the significance of these differences. We find that the relation between the number of board meetings and CEO tenure is weaker when the CEO is a member of the founding family. We also find that the relations between the intensity of board monitoring and CEO duality, board size are stronger when the CEO is a member of the founding family.