| Summary: | 碩士 === 開南大學 === 企業與創業管理學系 === 97 === Merger can maintain or raise the power of competition for enterprises, but it maybe cause the competitive harm for the market and injuring the benefits of consumers. Many government departments of competition law around the world have executed enactments for regulating the cases of mergers. The Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan (TFTC) regards Article 12 of the Fair Trade Act (FTA) as the basis for its regulations. Some key factors for judge cases of conglomerate merger that are TFTC would consider, including benefits of scope, effects of foreclosure and the market performances after the trade-off between benefits of scope and effects of foreclosure. This study discusses following questions: What kinds of relationships do conglomerate merger produce between the key factors that make up regulations, i.e., benefits of scope and effects of foreclosure and market performances? What is the relationship between different types of conglomerate merger and market performances? Furthermore, this study uses a research sample of 145 cases of conglomerate merger from Taiwan Fair Trade Commission between 1992 and 2008. The empirical analytical methods include a content analysis, SEM, discriminate analysis that employed to examine the data. The results confirm an insignificant positive relationship between benefits of scope and market performance. Effects of foreclosure and market performance have a significant negative relationship. Benefits of scope and effects of foreclosure have a significant negative relationship. At the same time, the results also confirm a structural coefficient between benefits of scope and market performance is less than a structural coefficient between effects of foreclosure and market performance. This result probably results from the research samples that are the cases of instance originated in the realm of practice, so leading to the different results between this study and the rule of FTA. Moreover, in consumer welfare, a relational coefficient of related conglomerate merger is more than a relational coefficient of unrelated conglomerate merger. In free competition in the market, a relational coefficient of unrelated conglomerate merger is more than a relational coefficient of related conglomerate merger. Above results could provide a referral about the strategy of conglomerate merger for the realm of practice and the government departments of competition law.
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