Corporate governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Death of Family Blockholders.

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 97 === The main purpose of this study is to analyze how Corporate Governance affects firm value and firm performance changes of listed companies by examining effects of deaths of Family Blockholders and in the following two years. We use Taiwan Listed companies as subjects...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yu,Te-Chen, 于德辰
Other Authors: Yeh,Yin-Hua
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/20538063497256157041
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Summary:碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 97 === The main purpose of this study is to analyze how Corporate Governance affects firm value and firm performance changes of listed companies by examining effects of deaths of Family Blockholders and in the following two years. We use Taiwan Listed companies as subjects and the research period is from 1999 to 2009. This paper investigates the relationship between the ownership structure and firm value by examining firm’s family blockholder’s death and also is treated as an exogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate governance related issues this way in Taiwan. We use a neutral event to evaluate firm’s ownership structure and composition of board of director affect firm value by analyzing the share price response to the death of a family blockholder. We find that the share price response to the death of a family blockholder is significantly negative with the level of the deceased's shareholding of firm shares. This result supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis. Final empirical evidences show that firm’s performance examining by ROA and Tobin’s Q increases, the controlling shareholders hold larger proportion of shares. Contrariously, if the controlling shareholders hold larger proportion of board seats, would lead to a lower performance as well.