An Empirical Study of the Information Asymmetric problem on Health Insurances
碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 風險管理與保險研究所 === 97 === This thesis is to investigate whether the adverse selection and/or moral hazard problems exist in health insurances of an insurance company. If these problems do not exist, the following two hypotheses can be justified:1. the insurance coverage does not affect...
Main Authors: | Sang-Min Hung, 洪桑民 |
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Other Authors: | Richard Lu |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2009
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71276267947842315811 |
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