| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 合作經濟學所 === 97 === The main purpose of this thesis is to study the relationship between earnings management、competition and risk-taking behavior by using a panel data sample of 74 cooperative banks for 5 countries during the 1994-2007 period. To enable a robustness of our empirical results, we have used the panel unit root test all the variables with the characteristics of steady state. Finally we have also used F test and Hausman test respectively in accordance with the same of national characteristics and all countries two samples to choose the most suitable model for Panel data regression analysis.
This paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, competition and indicating that high-level management manipulated earnings indeed to raise probability of cooperative bank’s insolvency. At the same time, lower competition of cooperative bank means less space for other banks in the loan market to promote cooperation banks more stable. We also prove that earnings management and competition are complements to affect bank risk-taking, meaning that managers will not be any acts of earnings management in lower competitive of the cooperative banks. Because of high Z-score in the lower competitive of cooperative banks means less space for other banks in the loan market (retail market), so high-level managers do not need to carry out acts of earnings management to conceal the profit-related information.
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