A Lagrangian Relaxation Approach For Combinatorial Reverse Auction

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 資訊工程系碩士班 === 97 === Auction is a kind of important business model for e-commerce. Combinatorial reverse auction can be applied in procurement to purchase goods at the lowest possible cost if there is complementarity or substitutability between the goods. A buyer can hold a reverse...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shih-Min Tsai, 蔡世民
Other Authors: Fu-Shiung Hsieh
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12767714560068947495
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Summary:碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 資訊工程系碩士班 === 97 === Auction is a kind of important business model for e-commerce. Combinatorial reverse auction can be applied in procurement to purchase goods at the lowest possible cost if there is complementarity or substitutability between the goods. A buyer can hold a reverse auction to try to obtain the goods from a set of sellers who can provide the goods. Each seller places bids for each bundle of goods he can provide. Although combinatorial reverse auction has attracted much attention recently, design of effective mechanism to guide the bidders to modify or submit their bids to collectively find a feasible solution requires further study. The problem is to determine the winners. In this paper, we consider a winner determination problem in which a buyer wants to acquire items from a set of sellers to process the task on hand. The task requires a minimal set of items for executing the operations. Each seller owns a set of items to bid for the task. The problem is to determine the winners to minimize the total cost to acquire the required items. The main results include: (1) a problem formulation for the combinatorial reverse auction problem; (2) a solution methodology based on Lagrangian relaxation; (3) an economic interpretation and (4) specification of the requirements for the implementation of our solution algorithms.